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INTRODUCTION 
In 1981, three years after the birth of the world's urst "test-tube baby," 1 
a series of events occurred that forever linked the reproductive technology 
experiences of the United States and Victoria, Australia. Mario and Elsa 
Rios, a married couple from Los Angeles, California, traveled to Victoria. 
Australia, to undergo an in vitro fertilization ("IVF") procedure at the 
Queen Victoria Medical Center in Melboume.2 The Rios' ten-year�ld 
daughter Claudia died from an accidental gunshot wound in 1978.3 Mr. 
and Mrs. Rios "tried desperately to soften the trugedy of Claudia's death 
with the happiness of another child, • but Mrs. Ri os, who was thirty-seven 
years old, was ineligible to undergo IVF in the United States due to her 
agc.4 
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The IVF procedure in Australia was successful and resulted in a 
pregnancy, but Mrs. Rios soon suffered a miscarriage and was unable to 
start another cycle. In 1983, before Mrs. Rios could undergo another cycle, 
she and Mr. Rios died in a plane crash, leaving behind two "orphan 
embryos."5 The Waller Committee, a body created by the Parliament of 
Victoria to examine the social, ethical, and legal implications of 1Vf,6 
recommended that the embryos be destroyed, apparently reasoning that 
"since [Mr. und Mrs. Rios] had not specified what should be done [with the 
embryos�, no one else had the right to do so and the embryos should just be 
thawed." Afier intense public outcry, the Parliament of Victoria amended 
the state's infertility legislation and required donation of the embryos to 
another couplc.8 The ultimate fate of the embryos, however, is unknown.9 
The Rios' story is significant for its influence on the development of 
assisted reproductive technologies ("ARTs"), namely, the cryopreservation 
of embryos for later use in IVF procedures. For example, the 
recommendations from the Waller Committee included ensuring "that clear 
agreement about the disposition of the embryos be reached before they are 
frozen."10 In addition, in 1984, the year that the Waller Committee 
released its recommendations, the world's first baby born through embryo 
cryopreservation was born in Australia. 11 ARTs include procedures other 
than IVF, such as artificial insemination ("AI"), which is "the oldest and 
most widely used [form] of assisted reproductive techniques." 12 "An 
estimated 20,000 to 30,000 children are born each year in the United 
States" through A1 from donor sperm ("AID") or from the husband's sperm 
("AIH").I3 Other ARTs include inserting eggs and spcnn into a woman's 
fallopian tubes ("GIFT") and inserting sperm directly into a woman's uterus 
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("lUI"). IVF, however, is still "[b]y far the mo�t v1sible, dramatic, and 
important assisted reproductive technique. "14 
The Rlos' story also serves as an important guidepost m the evolution of 
the ethical and legal discourse on fVF. Most importantly, though, the 
account of the orphaned Rios embryos provides a starting point for 
evaluating the divergent regulatory systems for ARTs in the United States 
and Victoria and for understanding why the virtually unregulated system in 
the United States is preferable to the Victorian system, which affirmatively 
provides assistance in accessing ARTs. This inquiry necessarily begins 
with an examination of the meaning and extent of procreative liberty. 
It has been almost two decades since the height of the reproductive 
revolution, u when John Robertson wrote his groundbreaking book, 
Children of Choice.16 Examining ARTs "through the lens of procreative 
liberty," Robertson advocated for a "strong normative commitment" that 
would give procreative liberty "presumptive priority in all connicts."17 His 
claim of the "presumptive primacy" of procreative liberty garnered much 
attention shortly after fublication and bas continued to factor into legal 
scholarship on ARTs.1 This Article contributes to the extensive dialogue 
on procreative liberty and ARTs by reexamining the value of Robertson's 
"presumptive primacy" framework in light of the experiences of the United 
States and Victoria with regulating ARTs. 
Robertson's approach to procreative liberty provides a means of 
understanding the largely unregulated ART landscape in the U nited 
States, 19 but Victoria has pursued a vastly different course and developed 
one of the world's broadest regimes for regulating ARTs. 20 Part I of this 
Article explores Robertson's radical approach to procreative liberty and 
discusses two trajectories of Supreme Court cases that demonstrate how the 
Court has "given life" to Robertson's theory of a right to procreate. Part D 
examines the different regulatory frameworks for ARTs bel\\� the 
United States and Australia. More specifically, Part II demonstrates bow 
the right to access ARTs in the United States is a neg;�tive right against 
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government interference, while partial reimbwsement from the government 
for ARTs in Australia suggests that there is a positive right to access 
assisted reproduction. In the state of Victoria, this reimbursement has led 
to extensive regulation, which reflects the recognition of a positive right, 
but also has the potent ial to arbitrarily limit procreative liberty. This 
Article concludes that the optimal way to address the complex issues 
surrounding access to ARTs is to protect the expansive notion of 
procreative liberty that Robertson espouses, subject to limitations only 
when the usc of ARTs could result in substantial harms that justify limiting 
reproductive choice. 
I. PROCREATIVE LIBERTY-THE FREEDOM TO HAVE AND TO A VOID 
HAVING CHILDREN 
John Robertson coined the phrase "procreative liberty" in Children of 
Choice as a way to address the controversies and conflicts surrounding the 
emergence of new reproductive technologies. 21 That these lCChnologies 
have "become available in an era of rapid change in sexual practices, 
gender roles, divorce rates, family structure, and economic life." 
characterized by an "increase in single-parent families, the emergence of a 
gay rights movement, and the ongoing fight for equal rights for women," Z2 
is as true today as it was in 1994 when Robertson published Children of 
Choice. Compounding these issues is the medical reality of infertility. 
Nearly twelve percent of the sixty-two million women of reproductive age 
in the United States experience " impaired fecundity, representing a 21% 
increase from 1995 to 2002."23 ln addition, roughly 7.4% of married 
couples are infertile.24 The percentage of the "infertile" is even higher 
when taking into account the "single individuals and same-sex couples 
whose infcn.ility docs not necessarily stem from impaired fecundity. "25 
This combination of advancing technology and infertility, and the social 
context in which they are developing, calls for a discussion of procreative 
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liberty to evaluate the scope of reproductive choice, particularly the right to 
access ARTs. An analysis of Robertson's notion of procreat ive liberty 
provides an understanding of the legal and theoretical framework against 
which the U.S. system of regulating ARTs has unfolded. 
The United States Supreme Court "has dealt for the most part only with 
a subset of reproductive issues, most notably liberty claims to avoid 
reproduction through birth control and abortion." 26 As a result, the Court's 
procreative liberty jurisprudence centers primarily on the right to avoid 
reproduction. Robertson takes a di ffcrent, more radical approach to 
procreative liberty.27 For him, procreative liberty means "the freedom to 
decide whether or not to have offspring.•28 Despite these seemingly 
divergent contours. dicta in the Court's procreative liberty cases suggest 
that tbcre is a constitutional right to procreate, and two trajectories of cases 
indicate that the Court would recognize th.is right to the positive side of 
procreative liberty.29 An expansive right to procreative liberty does 1101, 
however, mean that the right is absolute. Robertson's work and the Court's 
jurisprudence differ m the extent to which they suppon limiting procreative 
liberty, but the tr common feature is the acknowledgment that procreative 
liberty docs yield to certain competing interests. 30 
A. John A. Robertson's rodical approach to procreative liberty 
Robertson's conception of procreative liberty is bifurcated into (I) the 
freedom to avoid having children and (2) the freedom to have children.ll 
The freedom to avoid having children includes the pre-conception right to 
access contraception and the post-conception right to an abortion. The 
freedom to have children involves issues of gestation and reproduction, 
including the right to use ARTs, gamete donation, and surrogacy 
arrangements. 32 Robertson acknowledges that these freedoms are often 
discussed in the context of couples, but points out that procreative liberty 
"is first and foremost an individual interest. •ll He argues that this 
individual interest in the freedom to have children should apply to all 
individuals, regardless of marital status or sexual orientat ion, and therefore, 
does not believe that a majoritarian view of what is morally "right" is 
sufficient justification to limit reproductive cboice . .\4 
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One of the more controversial features of Robertson's theory is the 
"better to be born" argurncnL He regards life as a "net benefit" to offspring 
and does flO( consider reproduction to be "s"'1fnsible solely because 
children nn: born in undesirable circumstnnces." 5 In Robertson's view, 
individuals do not violate a moral duty when they make procreative 
choices.36 Furthermore, Robertson believes that the state has a duty not to 
interfere with tbose choices. He views procreative liberty as a "right 
against state interference with choices 10 procreate or to avoid procreation," 
meaning that individuals should be free to engage in "efforts to reproduce 
with the 'villing assistnnce of physicians and collaborators" and \vithout 
government interference in those efforts.37 This freedom is not, however, a 
right against private interference; individuals "may have a right against a 
state that denies them access to !VF[,] . . but they would not have the 
same right to services from private actors unless civil rights or 
antidiscrimination laws apply."J8 
Robertson concludes that the negative side-the freedom not to have 
children-{lnd the positive side-the freedom to have childrell-<lf 
procreative liberty both deserve "presumptive primacy when conflicts 
about [their] exercise arise because control over whether one reproduces or 
not is central to personal idcntiry, 10 dignity, and to the IJIClllling of one's 
life.•39 This acknowledgment of the significance of procreative liberty is 
prominently reflected in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudeoce.40 The Court's 
procreative liberty jurisprudence has focused primarily on the right to avoid 
reproduction through contrllccption and abortion.41 In fact, the Court "has 
not yet dealt with legal claims of infertile persons to procreate,oo42 
presumably "[b]ecause there have been few attempts by the government 10 
limit reproduction. oo4J Powerful dicta from two distinct trnjcctories of the 
Court's "privacy and family jurisprudence," however, persii3Sively suppon 
Robertson's conception of the positive side of procreative libcrty.44 
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B. Reflections of Robertson's View in U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
1. "Uberty as DignityN Cases Respect the Alllonomy of Reproductive 
Choice 
7 
The strongest grounding in Supreme Court jurisprudence for 
Robertson's approach to procreative liberty is found in the cases in which 
"liberty as dignity has played a critical role in securing the choices that individuals make to further their identity and personal goals.'o4S "Liberty as 
dignity" arises out of "America's deeply held values of freedom, 
individualism, and autonomy," and therefore, "commands respect" for 
individual choice and individuals' capacity for choice.46 The Supreme 
Court's clearest usc ofliberty as dignity is in cases that "protect individuals' 
perwna.l choices with regard to abortion and same-sex sodomy .... 7 The 
appropriate starting point, however, for an undcrstandmg of the Court's 
recognition of the positi"e side of procreative liberty illw.trated in itS 
liberty as dignity cases is Skinner v. Olclahoma.41 Skinner is not a true 
liberty as dignity c:�sc, because the Court's opinion did not actually invoke 
the word "dignity,"49 but the Court's use of "liberty" suggests that Skinner 
has come to stand for the proposition of liberty as dignity later featured in 
Planned Parent/rood of Southeastern Pennsyb'Onia v. Casey50 and 
Lawrence v. Texas. 51 
ln  striking down Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which 
effectively prevented procreation of certain classes of individuals based on 
the particular crimes they had committed, the Skinner court noted that the 
statute "deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the 
perpetuation of a race-the rigbt to have offspring:sz The Skinner 
decision is significant because only fifteen years earlier in Buck v. Be/1,53 
the Court upheld a Virginia statute that authorized the compulsory 
sterilization of"mcntal defectives" against due process and equal protection 
challenges brought by Carrie Buck, an eighteen-year-old woman who had 
been committed to the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble 
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Minded.54 The Court relied on a finding that Carrie Buck was "the 
daughter of a feeble-minded mother in the same institution, and the mother 
of an illegitimate feeble-minded child," and Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. famously wrote, "It is better for all the world, if ... society can 
prevent those who arc manifestly unfit from continuing their kind . ... 
Three generations of imbeciles are eoough."55 The Buck court's strong 
"anti procrcntion" language makes the subsequent decision in Skinner that 
much more meaningful for its influence on the development of a broad 
conception of procreative liberty. 
The Court ultimately decided Skinner on equal protection grounds, 
holding that Oklahoma's compulsory sterilization statute unconstitutionally 
discriminated against those who committed larceny by exempting 
individuals convicted of embezzlement 56 However, Ski1mcr is noteworthy 
because it is the Court's flfSt indication of the existence of a fundamental 
right to procreate. This is most C\�dent in the Court's "stirring endorsement 
of the right to reproduce as 'one of the basic civil rights of man.�s7 
Specifically, the Court noted that "[m]arriage and procreation are 
fundamental to the �'t'ljl existence and survival of the race," emphasizing 
that the Oklahoma statute "forever deprive[s individuals] of a basic 
liberty."sa This language seems to support an expansive definition of 
reproductive rights, which was further strengthened in the Court's Inter 
decisions addressing the right to access an abortion and the right to engage 
in same-sex sodomy. 
Forty-five years later, in Casey, the Supreme Court affinned the 
fundamental nature of procreation when it reviewed "five provisions of the 
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982.•59 Casey is noteworthy 
because the Court overturned the trimester framework established in Roe v. 
Wadtf'O in favor of an undue burden test for determining the extent of 
permissible limitations on a woman's right to access an abortion. 61 
Applying the newly crafted undue burden test, a plurality of the Coun 
" &ri. 274 U.S. 11 21». 201. 
" /d. M 21». 207. C'""pubcwy sl<nl- was no1 mnilcd 10 Vorpuo . .-ly 1111« -., ...... 
had euplCS _.,. tho& lllmhud peOple iA the fiDt half or the ....... . ... h cennuy s... ., . Kim 
s.-, p,_,., S<ttf<w "1ltout Slmturd m P"'fl,_ N.Y. Tunes. .bn II. 2012 ot AIJ rc-...1)-. 
motny of the nc:t.rly three dozen other sQtcs that ooce had eugcna procJ"amt sunh«d more peepk 
[&ben Nonh CaroJu" dldl. In Cahromla. about 20,000 people ""CR sterihzcd by 1M state. But the 
progr1m in North C.rohn.a, \\-tuch m1y have included as many as 7,600 people. Lb.ted the lonp and 
was one orthe mo6111aatCJ5i\·c. "). " See $1dm1t:r, 316 U.S. It S41 \When lhe law lays an unequal hand on &hose who haavc commilled 
intrinsically the same qu01h1y or otl"cn.se and sterilizes one and noc the other, i1 has made us lift invidiOU! 
a disain1imm� as if 11 Md tclcctcd a particular race or nationality ror �SI.IW: l�atmcnt '"). 
" S« Robc:liOOft, Jlf'#YI nol< 26. ol 327 (quoling .W..n<r. 316 U.S. II S41) 
" Skfllll<t", 316 U.S. ot 541 (<mpllasos odd<d� 
JO PloMod l'orcni'-J OfS< Po. Y. c-y, SOS U.S. 833.844 (1992) 
.. 410 u.s 113. ·� (1973). 
•• ea..,·. so5 u.s. • an . 76. T1oc: bosio: holdms or c-,. " 11oo1 • womaro has • "-"' ..,., """'* .. 
hive a .tlortion bc'fort �• hty ..t to obtam il withc:u IBJut Wltcrfcrmt"t: from the SUic • ld 11. 846. 
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upheld four of the five provisions of the Pennsylvania statute. The majority 
overturned only the spousal notifica6on requirement on the grounds that 
the threat of domestic violence facing two million families in the United 
States posed a substantial obstacle to a woman's ability to obtain an 
abortion.62 More importantly for the development of procreative liberty 
jurisprudence and the Court's recognition of a right to procreate, Casey 
equated the right to obtain an abortion with the constitutional protection 
afforded "to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, [and] 
contraception" and recognized that decisions to engage in such activities 
are part of "a realm of personal liberty [that] the govemment may not 
enter. "63 In language foreshadowing Robertson's position on the 
impemlissibility of using a rnajoritarian perception of morality to limit 
reproductive choice, the Court reasoned, "Our obligation is to define the 
liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."64 
The most powerful liberty as dignity language from Casey appeared in 
the three-justice plurality opinion. The plurality conceded that the lmdue 
burden test departed from the Roe trimester framework, but noted that "the 
Court's interest in protecting liberty as dignity was unwavering."65 Taking 
the concept of liberty in reproductive decisions a step further, the plurality 
wrote: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices cenlral to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are cenlra/ lo !he liberty proJected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept 
of existence. of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.66 
This famed "mystery of life" passage "[b)ear[s] a striking resemblance 
to the treatment of liberty subsequently expressed in Lawrence, [and] 
restores an expansive view of liberty in a tone that extols the evolving 
aspira6ons of self-governance," strengthening the claim that the Court has 
6! ld at 843-44, 887-88, 893-9S, 899, 90 I. The four provisions of the Pennsylvania scatute that the 
plurality upheld were that (I) a woman be required to give her informed oo.nsent before being able to 
obcain an abortion. (2) a woman receive 1he information at least twany·four houn before the procedure, (3) at least one of a minor'$ parents c.onsent to her being able to obtain an abortion, provided a judiei;al 
bypass mechanism is in place, and (4) facilities that provide abortions follow certain reportina 
requirements. /d. at 844. 
"/d:at847,851. 
.,. Compor� supra note 34 Md aocomp:tnyin& text., with Ctuq, 505 US. at 850. 
66 Henry, supra note 4S, at 210 (eitina Cosey, SOS U.S. a1 874-79). 
" Casey. SOS U.S. at 851 (emphasi-s added). This is the famed •mysaery of life" passage, as tenned 
by Justice Scalia. S« W.-rence v. Twu, 539 U.S. SS8, SS$ (2003) (Sc•li3, J., diucnting) (writing, "if 
lhe Court it referring not to the holding of Casey. but to lbe diaum of its famed sy,.--cet-mystcry"f·life 
passage'"). For a diSC\Ission of the cb.im that Justice Kennedy wrote the "mystery of life" passage, see 
Reva B. Siegel. Dignity and tire Polilics of Pro1ec1ion: Ab<mlon ResJrictioM Under' Olu)•/Corhort. 117 
YALE U. 1694, 1740& nn.lll-33 {WOS). 
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adopted an afproach to procreative liberty that accords with Robertson's 
formulation.6 
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court evaluated equal protection and due 
process challenges to a Tc�ns statute that criminalized samc-sc� sodomy 
after police officel'l) in Houston, Texas arrested John Geddes Lawrence and 
Tyron Gamer for engaging in "deviate sexual intercourse" in violation of 
the statute. 61 The Court held the statute unconstitutional under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that Mr. 
Lawrence and Mr. Gamer were "free as adults to engage in the private 
conduct in the exercise of their libeny.oo69 Justice Kennedy, the purported 
author of Casey's "mystery of life passage," began the landmark opinion 
with a striking pronouneement-"Liberty protects the person from 
unwarranted government intrusions into u dwelling or other private 
places" -reminiscent of its treatment of liberty in earlier privacy cases tbat 
involved abortion and contraception rights. 70 
The Court then went on to invoke liberty as dignity, putting its 
jurisprudence on an even firmer ground with Robertson's expansive notion 
of procreative liberty. Expanding on the discussion from Casey, the Court 
suggested that liberty is at the heart of determining one's identity because it 
"presumes an autonomy of self tbat includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intim:1te conduct "71 The Court declared that anti­
sodomy laws seek to criminulize personal relationships that arc within the 
liberty of individuals to choose and "acknowlcdge[d] that adults may 
choose to enter upon this relationship ... and still retain their dignity as 
free persons."72 As several legal scholal'l) have noted, "[t]hc most telling 
use of dignity in Lawrence, however, appc:ll'l) in the Court's recitation of 
the so-called 'mystery of life' passage from Casey. •73 Relymg on the 
'1 Lisa K. Pal'lhall, R«kfming Dutt Pro«u Ano/y5i.r: J11.fli� Anlho"Y M. K�nntdy and tht ColfCqll 
of�t R/tlhts, 69 AUl. I.. 1\l;V, 237, 2A3 (2006)(cmphasiJ lidded). 
" i..mwrM"�, S39 U.S.at S62� (IMJO"')' op;n..,� For •• on-depdt d- or the luslory llld 
lm--<IY-�. in<Nd"'C .. ·-11ooo dot .......... olf-. dod""' ......... .., 
_ ... ICU'">'· ,.. o.u CAIIeo"TU. F'-"lllA."T COI'DVCT T"" Sroav cw uo.u-a r. n:us 
(20 12� In hos boot. Pro- C.fllmler dsouss<s "the cmt �. hm>lonl, aod docp 
prejudices lhal o.nnnakd those involved at e'lrt.fY level or the case• amd •ltw: pn:senc:e of &'Cftder, race, 
aiC> and cluJ puls•na in the back&fOOnd." Jd. at xi . 
" La..'"""· 539 u.s. at 564. LoM'l't:.nc.! ovmukd &;,,.�$ v. Hordwlclc, in whlch fineen yearJ 
artier, the Court held thai • Georaia tlltute criminat�na IOdorny did not vioble the fulldamental 
npusor-. .. hbecause�,. not<>mb1111ional rip oo .._;. ....,...,..IIOdomy. 478 u.s 
186. 18349,192 tl916� 
.. u...m.r.. 539 u.s.  S62. 
" /d. 11562 
12 /d. ll S67. 
n Henry, lt�prrr note 4S. at 211; SC(t. t.g .. Neomi R"o, (),, ''- Us. and Abrmt of /Ag!tit)• ilf 
Uwtstlrntiooa/ La•. 14 COUIM. J. EIIR. L. 201, 241 (2008) ("Wbile lhemes o( doil'ily linked 10 
mdividuaJ aul080my hive been oprr�Md 10 other subsunt1W due process eases. 1M (OQ.tS on buman 
clognil)' ..t the rr<edom from "'""" emphosiood in W.rn« ui«s the Ccun fUttbc< - ,. ""Y 
previous--") 
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"mystery of life" passage, the Lawrence court concluded that homosexual 
individuals have the same rights as heterosexual individuals to engage in 
those actavities that are central to "deftn!ing] one's own concept of 
existence, of meaning. of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."74 
2. Libeny as Pril'acy Cases Protect the Privacy of Procreative 
Decision-Making 
The triumvirate of liberty as dignity cases, beginning with Skinner and 
becoming progressively stronger in Casey and Lawrence, suggests that the 
Supreme Court would recognize a constitutional claim of the freedom to 
procreate. In addition to the liberty as dignity cases, Robertson's 
conception of the positive side of procreative liberty finds support in 
another trajectory of Supreme Court cases-the "procreative liberty as 
privacy" eases. RobertSOn argues in favor of the "pi'Cl>umptive primacy of 
procreative liberty" to guard against "the highly mtrusive measures that 
governmental eootrol of reproduction usually entails."75 a view that is 
similarly rencctcd in the Court's contraception and abortaon jurisprudence 
focusing on individual privacy rights. 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute 
as applied to married couples tbat prohibited the use of contraceptives.76 
The Court cited Skinner as one of the "cases [that) bear witness that the 
right of privacy which presses for recognition (in the instant case) is a 
legitimate onc."77 Griswold, however, recognized u narrow right to 
privacy, the "privacy surrounding the marriage relationship,"78 with the 
opinion placing particular emphasis "on the marriage relation and the 
protected space of the marital bedroom. •79 
Subsequently, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court "established 
that the right to make certain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends 
beyond tbc marital relationship . ..so The Court held that a Massnchusetts 
law that pennitted distnbution of contraceplion to married individuals but 
banned distribution to unmarried individuals violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment St In so holding. the Court remarked, 
"If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from UJTWarranted gow!rnmcntal intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
� u...,..nc�� , 539 U . S m 574 (<llong Planned Parcndoood orse. Pa. v . Casey, 505 U.S. 833,851 
(1992)). 
" ROBERTSON,,t:upm note 12. •• 24-25 . .. 381 u.s 479,480,486(1965). 
rr ld at48.S. 
11 /d. at 486 
.. Umrm«, 539 u.s 11 564-65 . 
• ld•l.$65. 
" 405 u.s 4.!8,453-54 ttmJ. 
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or beget a child.•82 This language represents a transformatJvc moment in 
the Court's contraception jurisprudence and a re-charactcnzatioo of the 
right to privncy, from the narrow Griswold focus on the privacy of tbe 
marital bedroom to the broader Eisenstadt focus on a right to privacy that 
allows for control over reproductive decisions. 
Eisenstadt thus seems to provide substantial support for the claim that 
the right to privacy protects decisions about how an individual chooses to 
procreate. This is evident in tbe Court's reliance on Eisenstadt in its 
decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. LAFleur, which invalidated 
the school district's requirement that a pregnant teacher take mandatory 
maternity leave without pay beginning five months before the expected 
child's birth as an impermissible burden on tbe "freedom of personal choice 
in matters of marriage and family life.•l3 The Court's decision to link the 
teachers' desire not to take maternity leave with the right announced in 
EiseiJStadJ kto be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into . . . 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child"._. highlights the use of 
"contraception cases (dealing with the right not to procreate) to imply 
support for an expansive positive constitutional concept of procreative 
libeny."" 
In Roe v. Wade, the fmal case in tbe procreative liberty as privacy 
trajectory, the Supreme Court concluded that the right of privacy ensconced 
in the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of personal liberty "is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnaney."86 The Court invalidated Texas's criminal abortion statute, 
which made it a crime to "procure an abortion," except when doing so was 
necessary to "suv[e) the life of the mother."87 The Court cited Griswold 
and Eiserutadt approvingly for their protections of "personal marital, 
familial, and sexual privacy."88 Roe extended the conceptions of privacy 
developed in Gris-...vld and Eiserutadt by finding constitutional protection 
for a particular procedure related to reproductive choice. The Court was 
careful to point out, however, that the rigbt to obtain an abortion was oot 
absolute.19 It developed tbe trimester framework to reconcile the State's 
interest in the "potentiality of human life" with the fundamental right to an 
abortion and to delineate the pennissible extent of limitations on that 
right.90 The generation of an expansive right to privncy in reproductive 
n /d. IU 4Sl (ernph1111 added). 
" 414U.S. 632.639-40(1974) . 
.. /d. at 640 (cilma £bttt!ltadt, 40S U.S. at 4S3). 
" Ann M!liCltln MII�IC, R�lating CJtoi«: A Coostillllionol Law Rtspon� 10 Prvf�Ut>r John A. 
Rob<m01t'1 CholdrrnofCho""'· 52 WASH. &LEE L REV. 135, 151 (1995� 
• 410 U.S. I I), 15) (1973) .. /d . .. 117 18, 164 
• /dall29 
• ld at1SS. 
10 /dlli64M 
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choices outlined in Griswold, Eisensladt, and Roe, the avoidance of 
reproduction cases, imphes a counter-right that encompasses the right to 
reproduce. This bolsters the claim that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence 
recognizes the two component parts of Robertson's conception of 
procreative liberty. 
Both Robertson and the Supreme Court make it clear that procreative 
liberty is not absolute, but they differ as to the extent of their willingness to 
limit reproductive choice. Robertson believes that laws restricting the right 
to procreate should be subject to the same standard of "strict scrutiny 
applied to interference with fundamental constitutional rights," with the 
burden fulling on the party who seeks to restrict procreation "to establish 
the compelling harm that would outweigh the couple's procreative 
liberty.•9 Under Robertson's view, the autonomy of the individual who 
\\ishes to exercise the right to procreate deserves preswnptivc primacy; this 
procreative liberty will only yield to competing interests concerned with 
"effects on embryos, families, women, and other participants" when 
opponents of a procedure can demonstrate that such effects arc harmful 
enough to justify limitations on procreative choice.9Z 
Tbe Supreme Court, however, has taken a much broader view of what 
constitutes acceptable limitations on procreative liberty. In its initial 
abortion jurisprudence, the Court addressed abortion regulations through 
the trimester framework, holding that during the first trimester, the only 
relevant interests were those of the woman and her physician, but th.1t 
during the second and third trimesters, the State's interests in "the health of 
the mother" and "the potentiality of human life," respectively, justified 
regulation, and even proscription, of aborttons.93 Casey retreated from the 
trimester framework, with the plurality acknowledging that "the State bas 
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health 
of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child."94 When 
the Court handed down its decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, which upheld 
the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, it dispelled any lingering 
suggestion thai abortion regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, explaining 
that when the State "has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose an 
undue burden, [it] may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures 
and substitute others, all in furtherance of ils legitimate imcrests . . .  to 
promote respect for lifc."95 Although Robertson and the Supreme Court 
both acknowledge that procreative liberty is nol absolute, Robertson's claim 
" ROIIOI�"""' nooe tz. II J6, _,, 
" /d ... 17.24 
" Ro..410U.S.at 164-6$. 
" Planned l'aremhood ofSe. I'•· v. Cosey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 871 (1992) (1104ina dw 1post·RO<) 
cases dtXidcd !hal 1ny reJUblion touchin& upon the abortion decision 10051 sunnc: atrict scrutiny, (but 
they "'"""') be ,..._;kd With the hoWma m II« ol!df !hot the Stm has lqltomooe ,.......,. • • •  ., 
....,.._. .... _ .... life"). 
.. a-la'· c.n.... 5$0 u.s 124. tSI, t68 (2007) '""'*""added� 
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that any limitations should be subject to strict scmtiny con£1icts with 
Supreme Court precedent limiting procreative choice in the abortion 
context. 
An analysis of the liberty as dignity and privacy cases that comprise the 
Supreme Court's procreative liberty jurisprudence reveals powerful 
language tllat suggests tllere is a well-established rigllt to tile positive side 
of procreative liberty, albeit a right that will likely yield to competing 
interests in certain circumstances.96 This right to procreate presumably 
extends to ARTs, even though the "Court has never addressed the issue of 
procreation in the context of in vitro fertilization."97 Robertson argues that 
the right to procreate should include the right to use ARTs because "the 
principles that underlie a constitutional rigllt to reproduce would seem to 
apply to the infertile as we11."98 Thus, it is reasonable to infer that "the 
courts [would) protect the right of infertile persons to use noncoital means 
of reproduction," such as AI and IVF, to enable them to exercise their 
constitutional right to procreate.99 Ultimately, if "bearing, begetting, or 
parenting children is protected as part of personal privacy or liberty," as the 
Court's procreative liberty jurispmdence suggests, then "those experiences 
should be protected whether they are achieved coitally or noncoitally."100 
" See Brandon K. Moore, Note, Yi Ni v. Holder�· Forced Abortion's Impact Ott A Husband's Right 10 
Rt{JI'Oduco, 71 Mo. L. REV. 1294, 1299-1301 & nn. 52-67 (2012) (diS<ussing Skin..,., Griswold, 
Eisensladt, R<>e, and Casey and concludin& that •[t]he Court has thus held for decades that women in 
intimate relationships, especially marriage, have a fundamental right to decide wbethet to bear 
children''). 
97 Ouvis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d S-88. 60l (Tenn. 1992). The Court did, h�. p.nt certiorari in 11 
case involving implications of IVF to detennine "[w)hether a child who was concei"\·ed after the death 
of a biological paren&, but -.'ho cannot inherit person:. I property from tttat biologlca1 p�rent under 
applit:able state inteslacy law, is eligible for child survivor benefits under Title II of the Social Seeu:rity 
Act. • Petition for Writ of CertiOrari _. I, Astrue v. capato, No. 11-159 (petition for ce.rt. filrd 201 1). 
2011 WL 3511023. In Ast� v. Capa.ro,the Suprtme Court held that ibc posthumously tonceived 
children were noc entit� to survivor benefits from the Social Security Adminisuatlon because they did 
not •qualify for inberil&lte from the decedent under state intestacy Law. or satisfy one of the stntutory 
altemati\•es to that requirement.• 132 S. C1. 2021, 2025-26 (2012). For a review of the constituaional 
implications of the Supreme Court's deei:sion in Capato, see generally Nicole M. Bllmard. Note. Astl\l( 
v. Cap3to: Relegating Posthumously Conuh-ed Children 10 Stcond-Cim1 Citizens, 72 MD. L REV. 
1039 (2013� 
" ROBERTSON, Sllpro note 12, at 38. But see MICHELLE N. MEYER. NELSON A. l«>cK.EFELL£R 
I'NST. Of GoV'T, ST A TfS' REGULATION Of ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES; WHAT DoEs THE 
U.S. CONSTtnmON ALLOW'I4 (July 2009). a•wilol!le 01 http1/,.'WW • .otkinst.orglpdllhealth_card2009-
07-States_Regulation_ART.pdf. \[T)he Coun's abonion juri$prudcnce cannot, by extension. scand f« 
the proposition that the govemmeru may not interfere with individuals' pri\·ate decisions regarding other 
reproductive choices, ioc:luding cho&oc:s to use ARTs."), 
" See Robenson, #lpl'a note 26, at 328. 8Jtl see MEYER.. SUJ"'' note 98, al I ("(U)ndcr the best 
interpretation of the Supreme Coun's existing case law, .stales have ample room to {use of] ARTs"). 
• ROBEJtTSON. supra note 12. at 39� s« Robertson, supra note 26. a1 328 (proposing that infenilc: 
couples deserve a "prcsumpti\·e freedom• to have and rear children, "subject to limitation (only) if use 
of(ARTs) i�air[s] important state inttrnu" (emphas.is added)). 
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AUSTRALIA-A "NEGATIVE" AND "POSITIVE" RIGHTS DISTINCTION 
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The divergenl regulatory frameworks for ARTs in the United States and 
Victoria, Australia prompt an examination of another equally important 
aspect o f  Robertson's fonnulation-the view that procreative liberty is a 
negative right.101 The legal and theoretical framework of the U.S. 
approach to regulating ARTs indicates not only that there is a right to the 
positive side of procreative liberty, but also that it is a negative right that 
imposes no affinnative obligation on the government t o  ensure access to 
assisted reproduction. The scheme for regulating ARTs in Victoria, 
Australia stands in stark contrast to the U.S. system because the Australian 
government partially reimburses the costs associated with ARTs, I02 which 
implies that there is a right to the means necessary to procreate. 
Government coverage of ARTs has led to extensive regulation in Victoria, 
but NF case law from Victoria suggests that there is a positive right to 
access assisted reproduction. Although the Victorian scheme generally 
provides for broad access to ARTs, such a highly regulated system bas the 
potenti al to negatively impact procreative liberty. 
A. United States 
I. Procreative Liberty in the United States Is a Negative Right to Use 
ARTs 
The case law of the Supreme Court indicates that there is a 
constitutional right to the positive side of procreative liberty, the freedom 
to have children and the right to use ARTs to exercise that freedom.10> 
Importantly, the right to use ARTs is a negative right, which accords with 
Robertson's approach to procreative liberty and the Court's treatment of 
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed 
claims of procreation through NF, 104 but the limitations that the Court has 
imposed on other forms of procreative liberty, namely, the right to procure 
an abortion, in addition to lower court cases involving prisoners' claims of 
a right to procreate through AJ, strongly suggest that the right to access 
ARTs is a negative right. 
Robertson views the two component parts of procreative liberty as 
negative rights, which means that (I) individuals have the right to make 
procreative choices without interference from others, and (2) no one, 
JOt Sle Infra nOlcs IOS-106 and accompanying texL 
Mil &� infra notes I 78-183 and accompanying texL 
tO) &e srtpra J>art I. 
ww &e SJ1pro noce 97 nnd aocompanying texL 
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including the government, has a positive duty to provide the means 
necessary for indtvtduals to undertake particular procreative choices.105 
Under Robertson's conception of procreative liberty, a negative right to 
reproduce "docs not give [individuals] a right to demand from the state or 
others the services or funds that they need to achieve their reproductive 
goals.•I06 According to Robertson, even though one's right to reproduce 
may be limited, or even "severely constrained," by certain circumstances, 
such as access to medical care, financial means, and other socioeconomic 
factors, these nrc issues of social justice that fall outside the scope of 
procreative libcrty.t07 
Robertson's construction of procreative liberty as a negative right is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's formulation of constitutional rights in 
general because "there is no obligation on the government to provide the 
means necessary to exercise constitutional rights." loa 11lc Supreme Court's 
Fourteenth Amendment due �rocess jurisprudence illust.ratcs this notion of 
a "negative constitution."1 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Departmenr of Social Services, the case that is considered the "metonym 
for the Negative Constitutional State,"110 the Court held that the 
Department of Social Services did not violate the due process rights of ten· 
year-old Joshua DcShaney when it failed to remove Joshua from his 
father's custody, despite repeated reports of child abuse, which culminated 
in a beating so severe that Joshua suffered permanent brain damage 111 
Writing for a six Justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist famously noted: 
[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion 
by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's 
power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety a1ul 
security.' 12 
In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, a case with even more tragic facts, 
the Coun held that Ms. Gonzales did not have a property interest in police 
enforcement of a restraining order issued by a Colorado state trial coun 
against her estranged husband.ID Mrs. Gonzales brought a § 1983 action 
.., $« Ro8£ttT'JOH.IHpNII)Oit 12. ll lJ  MTJbe nept1VC: ncbt IO proatllt Of not doa nOI unply 
the dldy o( ocbcn 10 proov1Cie the l'tSOW'Ca or services neteu:tf)' to C'ltet'CtK OM'I proc:rra.t.w 
liberty . . . .  "). '" ld 41241 n.SS (ch. 2) . 
• ., Jd ftl 23. 
''" /d. at 238 n.) (ch. 2) 
•• See Suson Oandca. 1M Nrgalhw Co,utltudon: A CriJique, 88 MICU. L Rrv. 2271, 2273 (1990) 
(noting that 1t]l-chtiomlly. the procection:s oflhe Constitution ha"c: been v•cwed lafidy as prohibitory oonSb'aints on dle �'CT of sovanmcnt, rather than affinnati� duhct with which &'O'·mnnc:nt must 
com,rc. ' MJrC Spindolman. tlmlh. D)·•��g. ancl�ioo. I06MIC1t. L..R£v. l�t. t�8(2008) "' •89 us 119, 191· 93 (t989).. 
'" td llt9H ............. odckdl 
>U 50S US 7•1, 768 (20M). 
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against the Town of Castle Rock after her husband violated the restraining 
order and murdered the couple's three daughters. 114 The Court determined 
that "(t]he procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not 
protect everything that might be described as a 'benefit,"' and, citing 
DeShaney favorably, concluded that "the benefit that a third party may 
receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generaUy does not 
trigger protections under the Due Process Clause."11s DeShaney and Castle 
Rock thus clearly demonstmte "that the Constitution is a charter of negative 
rather than positive liberties."ll6 
This notion of the U.S. Constitution as a "charter of negative 
liberties"ll1 finds support in the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence. 
In a pair of cases decided three years apart, the Court affirmed the right to 
procure an abortion, yet acknowledged that the right is not a constitutional 
entitlement to the means necessary to access the procedure. Maher v. Roe 
involved an equal protection challenge to a Connecticut regulation that 
prohibited state Medicaid benefits from being used to fund nontherapeutic 
abortions but permitted coverage of the medical costs of pregnancy and 
childbirth.118 The Court upheld the regulation on the grounds that Roe 
protected women from "unduly burdensome interference" with the freedom 
to choose to have an abortion, but "implie[d] no limitation on the authority 
of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion."119 
The Court emphasized that the regulation did not restrict indigent women's 
ability to obtain an abortion, but rather "made childbirth a more attractive 
altemative."120 In language evoking the notion of a negative constitution, 
the Court noted that "'the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies 
for every social and economic ill.'"l21 
In Harris v. McRae, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde 
Amendment, which prohibited federal reimbursement of abortions 
perfonned under the Medicaid program, including most medically 
necessary abortions.122 The Court concluded that states participating in 
Medicaid are not required to fund medically necessary abortions if federal 
reimbursement is unavailable.123 Analogizing the Hyde Amendment to the 
Connecticut regulation at issue in Maher, the Court noted that the 
amendment "places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who 
•H /d. at 7SI-S4. IU frJ. If 756, 768. 
,,. O.:Shaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Oep't of Soc. S<rvs., 812 F.2d 298,301 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd,489 
u.s. 189 (1989). 
111 &ndcs, supro note 109, at 2273. 
'" 432 U.S-464.466,468,470(1977� 
11' ld. at 473-74. 
•zt ld. at 474. 
1!1 td. at479 (citation omiued). 
"' Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297. 302, 326 (1980). 
m Jd at 326. 
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chooses to tenninate her pregnancy.•124 The Harris coun ag;un focused on 
the Constitution as a guarantee of negative rights, reasoning that although 
the Constitution protects against "unwarranted government interference 
with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal dcc1sions, it does 
not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to realize all 
the advantages of that freedom."125 Funhennore, citing Griswold, the 
Coun eltlendcd the negative rights reasoning to contraception, reasoning 
that although the government cannot prohibit the usc of contraceptives, 
there is no "affirmative constitutional obligation" to provide individuals 
with the financial resources necessary to obtain contmccption.126 
"' /d. .. 315. 
"' /d. at317·11. 
IJI. Jd al ] 11, nt Mpb� np.a Ill) IICCCSS � is 'fiSibJc: ln lht QJfmll dctJE: O'rer lbt 
COUIIacq>llon ""'"""" .-,. o( Ill< r.- _,.. ond Aff<lodobk C... 111:.< 011 1--r 20, 
2012. Ill< � o( lbldl and H- Scniocs ..........S I (moJ Nk lbol - - hcoJih 
·� pions 10 _ ... � lor .u FOA....,..o•cd fonm or - oad p!O'ida I 
"""""acrnp11on ror n:l._,. c� Ne-o� Rdm<. US. !lop' oflblth ond H..,.. ScM.. "A 
s.-nmo by U.S D<t»•�""" o( Hcollh ood H...., ScM<cs S<crcwy Kodlkcn Scbchus' (Jaa. 20. 
2012�"""/al>k"' hllpJ,,.-..w.h.....,. . ..,...,l"""/2(112pm/Ol/20120120o homl In rapoou< 10-
opposii:K'In. the Obe.ma Admin111ra11on refined cbc: rule to aDow .. omen •ho work ror nono«empt 
retigiouJ orpna:attOns to rt«l'f't cocuraception C'O\'mii,Je dirtetly throuah tbc1r ubutltiCC c:omp;aDIC$. 
rathenhan throuaJt then C'mployce plans. lliE WltrT'E HooSE. OffiCE Of TtiE PUss S&:ClfTAlY, FACT 
SHEET: WMolrN'� PREvtNTIVE St.llVICES AND REUOIOCJS INSTITUTIONS (feb. 10, 2012). availoble at 
hnp:/Jwy,---w. whhehou...�.aovllhe-pn:s�offic:d20 12/0211 Olract·sbeet·women-s·prt'imUvc-Jervkts--•nd· 
rcligious·instiMions n.e U.S. Conference ofCalho!ic Bishops con1inues 10 oppose lhe contracept� 
n10Jld>oe. St< U.S. CO�fEA<lNC6 01' CATHOUC BISHOPS, BISHOPS RENEW CALL TO UOISLAnVE 
AC'fl()N OS R£LIOK)US LIBERTY (Feb. 10. 2012). a�-ailabl� at http:llwww.u»Ceb.orafllsuewnd· 
actionlrelif,10Us·hbo't)-1con»e:lc:nce...prO&td.lonlbi:Shop$-t'enew�ll40-q.u.lalt\'e-ac.:tH.Xl-on·rehllous-­
hberly.cfm (cono<rtdona lhoo the "lodt of clcor prooectioo for key tl>kehold<rs. • 11 unoc:cq>Cabk ond 
miiSI be comcocd') The -te has p:omplcd """"""" fodenl to�"'"'" chol""""' Ill< 
COIISIIwoonohoy of the ..,.,_.,. mandate. Sec. '-B·· <:Oftl'laonL Mt>ntiU > U.S ll<p' o( Hcalllt 
ond HllnlOII Sm-1. No. 12CV030)S (0. Neb. Fd>. :U. 2012); C>mpwno, Eu-mol World T� 
i'<IWU\. inc.> Scbdous. N>. 2:12�501 (N_O.Aia. Feb.9.2012�C>mp-CGiondoCiomiJM 
u.;,. v. Scbd-. M. I :2011<>113550 (0 Colo. Dee. 22. 2011). For ..... on Juo< 2013. olo: U.S. 
Coo.1 o( Appcols for Ill< T<Oih Cor<W< held lhllo croll -.: dtooo-' o Cltnot.., boo�.-.:,..._ -... 
a>nllcd 10 br1111 • ....,. .-(Ill< Rd-freedom--., Aa� .,.,.. .........,... ololdo._ o( 
,._.. lbol lh<or n,tos .- lhtl - on: -rially burdcftcd by lhc _,_,.._.,,.. 
rcquiremeno (of 1M Pot- Pooocclloo and Aff-C... IV:.<J, ond "'- � ., ""'*"""' 
homo.' Hobby l..obby Soorn. Inc. • Scbdous. 723 F.Jd 1 1 14, 1121 (lOIII Cor 2013).-,-nl, 134 
S. CL 678 (2013� On n:mand. ohe u.S O.Jlria c .... for lh< w......, O.stn<t ofOtloltomo pntcd Ill< 
P!ainriffs' rcquc:st for • prehmenwy mJuncoon and. per the parues" all'ftffl(nt,�ta)'Cd procccdntp in the 
t�se unol October I, 201l to allow the federal government to decide v.hctMr to seek review of the 
Tenlh Cin:u11'1 dcctsion in lbe Supreme Cotm.. See Hobby Lobby S1orcs, lAC. v. SebclnaS1 No. CIV-12-
1000-HE. 2013 WL }869832 (W.O. Ol<laluly 19, 2013). The <D><. S<b</1"' v. IWbb.v l.obb_vSI<NTS. 
Jnt· .• is se1 for oral IUJumcnl brfuorc the Supreme Coul1 on Morch 25. 2014 S« Scbc:lius v. Hobby 
LOOby So.,.... Inc .• SCOTUSbloJ. hllp1/www.scotusblog.comlcose·fil<tlcali<Sisebchu.-v-hobby·lobby­
stc:ns.-inc/ (taq �•haled JJn. 12, 2014). On December 31. 201l, 1n "  II:P""'Ic case, Jw.tic:c Sonia 
Sotonoa)OI" ofohe SIIJ"ttnc Coon ••IIJl<d on order thoo oemporonly <nJOin• ohe fedo:ntl""'""""'l •&om 
cnforeina ap�n..- (the Lank SlS1en of the PDoOC Home for the Apd) the OORiriO!I'iiJ\-e co-.� 
rc:quir<n1<rt1S •-ocd by ohe p.,...,, Prolect1011 ond AITurdoblc: Con: Aet. 42 U.S. C. t l00g-l:l(o)(4� 
and rrlalcd ,....I>I>M\, • pmd"'' o ._.,. &om  Ill<"""""""" ond IUnh« ordcr f101111hc Supan< 
Coon. Lillie s...... o( Ill< Poor Horne ror olo: Aged. D<rm:r. Colo \ Scbdu-. Onkr. '"' 13A691 
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While "[n)either the Supreme Court nor lower courts have [sic) directly 
addressed the existence of fundamental rights to use assisted reproduction 
and genetic screening technologies,'' 127 lower federal courts have indirectly 
faced such issues in tbe context of prisoners' claims of a constitutional right 
to use AI to impregnate their spouses. These cases demonstrate that tbe 
right to procreate in the United States is limited as a negative right. In 
Goodwin v. Turner, Steven Goodwin filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus, claiming tbat the refusal to let him give his wife a semen sample for 
AI while he was in prison violated bis constitutional right to procreate.l28 
Mr. Goodwin filed his petition in 1987, four years before the earliest date 
on which he would be released and eight years before his latest possible 
release date. He wanted to use AI because his wife would be between 
thirty-one and thirty-five years old upon his release, and they did not want 
to delay conception out of concern for the possibili7, of increased risk of 
birth defects that results from increased maternal age. 29 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the 
fundamental right to procreate, but declined to address Mr. Goodwin's 
argument that the constitutional right to procreate survives incarceration. I 30 
Rather, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that, assuming Mr. Goodwin was 
correct about the primacy of the right to procreate, the "restriction is 
reasonably related to (the) legitimate penological interest of treating all 
prisoners equally."131 The court concluded that, under the Bureau of 
Prisons' administrative policy, if the prison accommodated Mr. Goodwin's 
request, then it would have to provide female inmates with additional 
medical services, which would "tak[ e) resources away from . . .  legitimate 
penological interests."132 
In Gerber v. Hickman, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
faced a similar claim to the one posed in Goodwin, albeit with slightly 
different facts. William Gerber brought a § 1983 action alleging that the 
Warden of the Mule Creek State Prison in California violated his 
constitutional right to procreate by not allowing Mr. Gerber to artificially 
(Dec. 31, 20 13). awllfobft at �ap�/www.bcck<tfund.orr/wp--nentfuploads/2014/0I/13A691·Lillle­
SistCI'$-v-S<beliU$-()rder.pdf. 
ll1 Robertson. $1.tpro note 26, at 327. 
"' 908F.2d 139S, I396(8thCir.l990). 
ll't ld. at 1396-98. For an ovuview of Mr. Goodwin� petition, from requesting that the sampk be 
collected under s:mitary conditions. 10 requesting that his wife be pennined co insetniNIIe herself in a 
prison bathroom. ser ;a. "' hl •• 1398. 
ut ld at 1396, 1398. 
•» Jd. at 1400. John Robe11$01l bas critici� the Goodwin decision for a:iving •insuff'teient weight 
to abe coupk's reproducti\·e intcresl and too much weight to the prison authorities" cJa.ims or 
administrative inconvenience." ROBERTSON. s11pro noce 12, at 37-38, 240 nn. 50-S I (ch.2). 
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inseminate his wife while he was in prison.l33 Mr. Gerber, who was 
serving a prison sentence of I 00 years to life, wanted to ha'·c a baby with 
his wife, so he requested that he be able to ejaculate into a collection 
container and send the sample to a laboratory via overnight mail or have his 
attorney return the sample, with all costs to be borne by him and his 
wife.U4 Mr. Gerber supported his claim by arguing that Skinner was a 
guarantee of a constitutional right to procreate while in prison, a claim that 
the Ninth Circuit firmly rejccted.llS 
The Ninth Circuit assumed that there is a constitutional right to 
procreate and, taking the step that the Eighth Circuit was hesitant to take in 
Goodwin, held that "the right to procreate is fundamentally inconsistent 
with incarceration."'){; Citing case law from the Second Circuit, the court 
noted that "'the right[s) to many and procreate, arc . . . abridged in a prison 
setting. *117 The most persuasive language from Gerber supporting the 
claim that access to ARTs in the United States is a negati'c right is the 
court's acknowledgement that "'inmates possess the right to maintain their 
procreative abilities for toter use' . . .  not current use. •m This suggests 
that while the government has a duty not to interfere with or prevent an 
individual's freedom to procreate, it does not have an obligation to facilitate 
the exercise of that freedom when extenuating circumstances of 
socioeconorruc or penological barriers arc present 
The combination of the Supreme Court's procreative liberty 
jurisprudence and the status of the U.S. Constitution as a "charter of 
negative liberties" demonstrotc that there is a robust negative constitutional 
right to procreate, which includes the right to usc ARTs. Furthcnnore, the 
limitations imposed on the right to procure an abortion and on prisoners' 
rights to artificially inseminate their spouses imply that the right to use 
ARTs is not fully protected through aflimutivc constitutional obligations 
"' Gcrl>ot •· Hockman, 291 F.:ld 617, 619 (9th Cir. 2002). e<rt dmw, 537 U.S. 1039 (2002� The 
Gwf:,w deriMn raulkd after a rtbeanna en t.nc,. with sax Judaa JOUHllJ the ma)Oilty and fh-e judges 
� Jd el617. 
"' a..w. 291 FJ<I 01 619. Mr. Gcrl>ot dod DOC �  • powol< clal<, wbd> """"' IIIII II< ,.  ... DOC 
entitled to rarmty "i..s.-.:s, so be end hll ... rc could no( conc:ci''C • dukl neonlty. 1\J • result. he wanled 
k) be able 10 ar\lfK:I�Jly U\SCmiaate h11 Wife. /d 
'" See ld at 622 ("Skinner stands only for the proposition th;;'lt forced Sla'JICII atenliz.ation of 
prisoners violates the Equal Protecllon Clause.'"). But sn /d. at 628 (Tashima, J .• disscntina) (claiming 
that the ma)Ofll)' read $iimtet' too narrowly because nOll pn11na Gerber's request meant thai he "{wu] 
fore\udcpwcdofebtil< tibcny" (quo<ona-•· Okl"*'-.316 U.S. 53S, 541 (1942)). 
,,. /d. .  619 (-1)' "'""""'); '"...., id. .  62A (T ........ J, cliaeDiilol) ("111<--
thM. dilcft IS I f·ec1·n '11 rigbl to proc:R:U.Ioa 101 I ..... There taD be ItO� thel. aadl I • 
cuSIS. "). Bw u. IJ • 631 (Kozuut., J . d"-mg) ("By moltona ·��� fur -1 mios)for 
oatain inmlltesf, the Department or Con-�ttons must ha� concluded thai imprisonment does 1101 tul 
off a prisoner' a nj.ht to procreate. •). 
"' !d. 01 621 (majorily opinion) (q""''"' Hcmandu v. Couahlin, 18 F.:ld Ill. ll7 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(rejec:tina ptainhll't claim thai denill of conjupl visitaoon rn�iteaes violated hit conltJtl.lliol rigtu to 
-""� pri>'OC)')� 
•• /d.u622(.........,.-.!)(-""Ho ' ,ISfJ<Ial){i). 
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on the state to ensure that individuals have the means necessary to exercise 
their freedom to procreate through assisted reproduction. 
2. Regulatory Framework of !VF Reflects the Negative Reproductive 
Rights Jurispntdence 
The system of regulating ARTs in the United States flows naturally 
from the Supreme Court's and lower federal courts' reproductive rights 
jurispmdence and the notion of a negative constitution. As a result, there is 
almost no governmental regulation of ARTs at either the federal or state 
levels. Regarding access to ARTs, "individual states have been slow to 
provide legislation,"l39 and among those that have done so, the access is 
not particularly meaningful. The fact that regulation of ARTs in the United 
States is both rare at the federal level and inconsistent at the state level 
reflects the understanding that the right to use ARTs is a negative right. 
The most conclusive proof of the federal government's recognition that 
the right to use ARTs is a negative right is federal inaction. The federal 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA ") does not conta.in 
any provisions specifically directed at treating infertility, and Medicare 
docs not provide ftmding for ARTs.140 In addition, the federal legislation 
currently in place takes the form of providing oversight for public welfare 
rather than serving as a means of enabling individual access to ARTs. The 
only federal legislation specifically directed at ARTs is the Fertility Clinic 
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 ("the Act").141 The Act 
requires each clinic that performs ARTs to provide armual reports to the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") on the following: (I) 
"pregnancy success rates" achieved through each type of ART procedure, 
(2) identities of the embryo laboratories used by each clinic, and (3) 
whether the embryo laboratories are certified under the Act.142 The 
'" Susan B. Apel, Access IOAssisted Reproducth.w Ttehll()/og/a, 12 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & l. 33, 
37 (2008). 
•• llo<Oihy E. Rob<n$. ROC< and the New Rtpraduction, 41 HASTINGS l.J. 93S, 940 (19�� Susan 
Donaldson James. Het�lth Care 8;// Offers Little Ccnifort to Infertile CO#:plu. ABC NEWS (Apr. 23. 
20 I 0), bup:J/abenews.go.comfHealth/ReproductivcHealthlinferti lity·heallh-c:are-bi IJ-klnger-pre­
exi.scing-condition/stoty?id•I04SI369. In a po5iti\'e change for inferli� patitnlS. lhe PPACA 
eliminates pre-existing condition$ exclusions. w11ich had been used in the past to dtny health insurance 
coverage to women on the: basis of pasc infertility dilgnoses. Ni2an Oeslevich Paekin, The Other Side 
of Health Care Reform: An Analysis of the Missed Opportunity Regarding Infertility Trratmenrs. 14 ScHoLAR I, 30-31 (20 II). 
'" Pub. l. No. 102-493, 106 Sml 3146 (1992� In lanuaty 2009, th<n·Rep. Anthony Weiner 
introduced tbe Family Building Act of 2009 in the House of Representatives.. "''hich called for rdonns 
to the Public Health Service Act and the Employee Recirement Income Security Act of 1974 to require 
coverage of infertility rrc:atment. H.R. 697. 1lllh Cong. (2009). The proposed legislAtion �·er 
reached the floor of the House of Representatives. See H.R. 697 (Ill rh): Family Building Act of 2()09. 
GOvn<ACK.US, hup1/www,govtmck.uslcongr<Wbillsil lllhro97 (last visited Jan. II, 2014) (listing the 
status of the bill as "Died (Rererrcd to Committee)'"). 
"1 42 U.S.C. § 263a·l(a) (2006). 
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purposes of the Act are to provide consumers, meaning indtviduals who 
desire to usc ARTs, with accurate infonnation about clinics and to provide 
states with a model program for certifying embryo laboratories.143 The Act 
clearly is not intended to regulate the mechanics of using ARTs or to aid 
individunls in accessing the proccdures144 This supports the position that 
the right to use ARTs is a right against government interference, not a 
guarantee of government assistance. 
In addition to the CDC, two other federal agencies have regulatory 
authority over the use of ARTs, but their involvement is even more 
indirect. First, clinics that pcrfonn ARTs can only usc medications 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), a requirement 
that applies across the entire medical ficld.145Second, under the Clinical 
Laboratories Improvement Act, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services ("CMS") is respoosible for regulatmg all laboratory testing in the 
United States, including tests associated with ARTs.'46 The consumer 
protection and public safety oriented roles of the FDA and CMS \vith 
respect to regulation of ARTs further demonstrate that the purpose behind 
federal regulation of ARTs is to protect the public, not to provide the public 
with access. 
At the state level, inconsistent regulation reflects the basic premise that 
the right to procreate through the use of ARTs is a negative right. This is 
most evident in the context of state legislation mandating insurance 
coverage for ARTs, as very few states provide any meaningful access 
through their insurance legislation. Roughly two-thirds of employers 
report that the insurance plans they offer provide at least some coverage for 
infertility services, but only a small portion of the plans cover advanced 
infertility treatments like IVF.147 For example, less than one-fifth of large 
employers (those with over 500 employees), offer plans that cover IVF, and 
among smnll employers (tho se with fewer than 500 employees), only one­
fourth offer any infertility coverage.l48 
l-0 PlESU)£.,-r'S COltNC1L ON 8JOt!'nUCS, REPR.OOUC"'llN & RE.sf'ONSIBll.ITY: "nUl REGULA� or 
NEw DIOThCHNOLOOIES 47 (2004� nvollab/1 at 
http:llbioeth1CI.Jt"'O''down.edulpc�poculreprodutlion:u'dretpOOSibi lityf _pcbc _final_ reproduction_ a 
nd_rcspoMibillly pdf (baeinaft<r lttPttOOUCT""' & RESPONSIBILITY: ThE Rl<lvi.ATION OF NE'A 
8lO'Il;CH>I()U)u:s I 
... ld. 
ws A).I£RkA' S0CETY FOa R.EP1t00l1CTIVE MEDIC'IXl. 0vtasK;ttr Of" A$SISTEO RUaooi.JC'mE 
'fE<:H);()U)()y 6 (2010� avoUobl• at 
hup://wwwr<productiV<foctS.OIJ/uplooclcdFoles/ContentiAbout_Us/Media_and_Pubt"'-Aifaon/O•mil 
cOfART%20(2 ) pdf(hcrcinafter OVrtU!IOIITOI' ASSISTED REI••OWCTIVI! 'l'llCH!<OLOOY). "' Pub. L No. 90-174,81 StaL 536 (l967)(cunent vcnion ao42 U.S.C. § 263a (2006)Y, OVEltSIGHl 
OF ASSISTED R£rltOOUC'ri\-'E TecttNOI.OOY,.JIIP"' ,_ 145, at6-7. 
"' ---- 23.•1049 . .. /d. 
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To remedy this situation, some states have passed regulatory 
legislation, but "the regulation is all over the map."149 Only fifteen stateS 
have enacted laws that provide insurance coverage for infertility 
services}SO States that require partial coverage of infertility impose 
conditions that range from one-time only IVF benefits for married couples 
who have at least five years of infertility (Hawaii), to limiting coverage to 
four egg retrieval cycles unless a live birth occurs (Illinois), to allowing 
insurers to cap IVF benefits at $15,000 (Arkansas) 1S1 Furthermore, 
California, Louisiana, and New York specifically exclude IVF coverage. IS2 
Even states that provide "complete coverage" place certain limitations on 
access; Rhode Island limits IVF benefits to a lifetime $100,000 maximum 
for married couples, and New Jersey provides religious exemptions for 
small employers. ISJ This diverse state legislation indicates that access to 
ARTs is best characterized as a negative right not only because thirty-five 
states do not require any fonn of infertility coverage, but also because those 
states that do provide some form of coverage impose restrictive conditions 
on individuals' ability to access ARTs. 
Another result of the limited federal and state regulation of ARTs is that 
a wide range of procedures is legally permissible. For example, there is no 
direct regulation of preimplantation diagnosis ("PGD") or sperm sorting, 
techniques used to perfonn genetic testin/L 
on early-stage embryos before 
they are implanted into a woman's uterus.1 The capabilities of PGD have 
increased since the technology's inception in 1990, and today it is possible 
to test for genetic abnormalities, susceptibility to cancer and late onset 
disorders, human leukocyte antigen matches for existing children, and, 
"" Bioetlrlca ot thtt lnstlltlte: R�ulntllfg ART. An Interview with James JY. Fossell and M�elte/1� N. 
Meyer, NELSON A. ROCK£FEU.ER. INST. Of Gov'T (July 2010) [hereinafter 8ioeJ.hics 01 the lnstiJule: 
Ref!:,loting ART). hnp1/www.rockinstO<giQAirOoSS<II_meyer/Bioelhics4.aspx. 
The slates are ArknnSD$, California. Conneelicut, Ha\lo'3ii, Illinois. Louisiana.. Mal')'ltmd, 
M:tSsachuse.tts. Mon1ana, New Jersey, New Y ort, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas. and West Virginia. SloJ• 
LtiW$ R"Oitd 10 lnruran« Co� for lr(ert.iliry Treatment, NAT"L CONFERENCE OF STAT£ 
LEGISI..An!RBS [hereinafter lns,,ranett Co� for Jnfortillry Treatment). http:/lwww.ncsl.or;fissucs­
researtM.eallhlinsuranoe-e<werage·for·illfertiHty·laws.aspx (last updated Mar. 2012). These fiR·c:cn 
stntc:s offer eovc:rage in the following four ways: (1) eornplece coverage mandates that require insum-s 
to cqver infertility treatment including lVF, (2) partial coverage mandates that require insums 10 covu 
IVF. but with certain limitations on ac<:t:$S. (3) CO\·erage offer mandates 1hat require insurers lO ojfu a 
policy that covus IVF but docs not require employers to adopt the policy, and (4) "non-IVF mandates" 
that require insurers to cover infertility treatment buc expiK:idy exclude IVF. Cohen & Chen, s11pro 
nOte 2, a1 S37-38: st¥ also lnSlu-on« Co,.,.,. for Jnfonlllry Tnormenl, supm ("'Thirteen 5la:tC$ . . .  
require insurance tompanics to cover infertility 1reat:ment. . , . California and Texas [only) rcquin­
insura.nce companies 10 otTer coverage . .. .  j. 
"' Pack in. s.upra note 140, at 21-22; lnsuroncr Covtrage for lnfertlliry TtWltmtnt, IIAJ)t'tl note 1 SO. 
"3 lnsul'tl1t« Co\te� for Jnfertility TIY!tltmml, supra note I SO. 
UJ Paclcin, s.upro note 140, at 22: Insurance Covet'Qgf' for /"fertility Treotmem, supro note I SO. 
'"' RBPROOUCTION & R.ESPOSSIBIUTV: 'niB REGULATLON OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOOIES, supra note 
143, •• 89--90, 99. 
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somewh:u controversially, a des ired sex in an embryo, known as sex 
selection. 155 
In the absence of significant government regulation of ARTs, the 
medical profession is lcfl to self-regulate the procedures. Fertility clinics 
and health care professionals make decisions regarding ARTs with 
gttidance from professional societies like the Amcricun Society for 
Reproductive Medicine (" ASRM"), a "specialty society for physicians 
[who] focus on infertility," and its affiliate, the Society for Assisted 
Reproductive Technology ("SART"), an organization whose membership 
includes over 9001. of the fertility clinics in the United Sllltes.t56 The 
guidelines and reports from the ASRM serve as important sources of 
guidance for physicians who perform PG0.157 
1be ASRM Ethics Committee notes that PGD for sex selection 
waiTIIJlts "serious ethical caution,"l58 but it does not call for a legal 
prohibition on the procedure. Instead, the guidel ines suggest that PGD for 
non-medical sex selection "not be encouraged" when a patient is already 
undergoing an IVF procedure and that it "be discouraged" when a patient 
wants to undergo IVF solely for sex seleetion.159 1be extent to which 
physicians an: expected to "not encourage" or to "dtscourage" PGD for 
non-mcdtcal sex selection is unclear, as some SART member clinics 
advertise the procedure, even though SART requires adherence to the 
ASRM Ethics Committee guidelines as a condition of membcrship.160 
However controversial it may be, the status of PGD for sex selection thus 
serves as an example of the broad range of legally pcnnissible procedures 
that has resulted from the l imited regulation of ARTs in the United States. 
In practice, the usc of ARTs reflects the judicial and legislative 
determination that access to the procedures is a negative right in the United 
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States. Studies have found that '"the United States has one of the lowest 
utilization rates of (ARTs] per capita among industrialized countries;" in 
panicular, the utilizat.ion rate is one-fifth of the rate in Australia_l61 The 
CDC estimates that approximately 2.1 million married couples, roughly 
7.4% of that population, experience infertility_l62 Fewer than 20"/o of those 
couples, however, use advanced ARTs like rvF.l63 This is likely because 
the expenses associated with advanced ARTs put the procedures out of 
reach for many infertile couples. For example, the uvcrnge cost of one TVF 
cycle is about $12,400, and the cost for a cycle of PGD for sex selection 
can rise above $18,000.164 
Compounding the financial expense of individual cycles is the fact that 
many women undergo more than one cycle of IVF to have a live birth.16S 
According to the CDC, slightly more than 1% of the toUII number of births 
in tbe United States result from ART cycles.166 That year, clinics 
performed 147.260 ART cycles, including IVF, GIFT (gamete 
intrafallopian transfer), and ZIFT (zygote intrafallopian transfer).l67 JUS! 
under 32"/o, or 4 7 ,090, of the cycles resulted in live births, for a total of 
61,564 infants.l61 Overall, the cost of a live birth through IVF is estimated 
to be between $66,667 and $114,286, which in the absence of government 
assistance, individuals must cover out of pocket.169 
In the United States, the use of ARTs and the ability to access the 
procedures are virtually unregulated.170 There is little federal oversight, and 
state-mandated access legislation is neither consistent, nor comprehensive. 
The limited extent of regLLiation, combined with the Supreme Court's 
procreative liberty jurisprudence and tbe status of the Constitution as a 
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"charter of ncgatave liberties," provides Strong suppon for the conclusion 
that there is a robust negative right to procreate through the usc ARTs in 
the United States that imposes no affirmative obligations on the 
government to ensure individuals are able to access treatment procedures. 
B. Vicloria. Australia 
I. Australian Health Care System Has Created a Positive Riglrt to 
Access ARTs 
If the United States is the clearest example of a negative right to 
procreate through the usc of ARTs, then Australia is at the complete 
opposite end of the spectrum as perhaps the clearest example of a positive 
right to government assistance in accessing ARTs. The Parliament of 
Australia has fostered a positive right to access ARTs by including partial 
reimbursement for ARTs in the country's national health care system. Tbe 
Australian system helps all individuals, whether they are covered solely by 
state health care or have additional private insurance coverage, access the 
means neccssa.ry to procreate through assisted reproduction. 
From the ethical dilemma surrounding the cryoprcscrvation of the Rios' 
orphan embryos, to the world's flfSt baby born through IVF after embryo 
cryopreservation, Australia is somewhat of a pioneer in the field of 
ARTs.171 ln addition, the Parliament of Victoria enacted the world's first 
ART legislation in 1984.172 Despite th is auspicious history of pioneering 
technology and legislation, Australia today faces infertility concerns similar 
· to those in the United States and other developed countries around the 
world. Studies indicate that "the population replacement value [is] 2.1 
births per woman[, but i]o Australia, the total fertility rate in 2002 was 
1.76, which is comparable to that in the UK, USA and Canada."173 Unlike 
in the United States, "there is no national data collection on mfertility in 
Australia," but the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare estimates that 
roughly 9"/o of couples experience infertility.174 To address these concerns, 
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the Australian government partially reimburses the �ts associated with 
ARTs.m 
Australia has universal health care coverage, which means the entire 
population is covered by Medicare, the state-funded heallh care system.'76 
A fairly significant portion of the population, roughly 30.5%, also has 
private insurance coverage, although private health insurance enrollment 
has declined since the introduction of Medicarc.177 Medicare has provided 
coverage for ARTs since 1990, and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
funds drug therapies associated with treatment proccdurcs.178 Importantly, 
there is "no restriction on the number of [ART] cycles or services" that an 
individual cun acccss.l79 
Medicare coverage of ARTs is not absolute, but ruther takes the form of 
partial reimbursements. After introduction of the Extended Medicare 
Safety Net in 2004, Medicare now reimburses either (I) 80"1o of the out-of­
pocket and out-of-hospital expenses of those individunls whose expenses 
exceed the current safety net threshold or (2) the current amount of the 
Extended Med1carc Safety Net Cap, whichever is lower.110 The out-of­
pocket costs for one cycle of IVF typically vary from $1,079.1 1  to 
$2,517.93.'81 Private health insurance "can help further reduce the costs 
associated with (ART] treatment(s like fVF] - by covering day hospital 
expenses and some medications, which are not covered by Medicare." 182 
Thus, even though Australians who use ARTs pay some out-of-pocket 
costs, the Austrnlinn health care system essentially creates a positive right 
of access by providing reimbursements for procedures without limiting the 
number of times individuals can seek treatrncnt.I8J 
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The consequence of Medicare funding for an unhmited number of ART 
procedures is that "[t]he burden of the cost of ART . . . falls more beavily 
on the Austrahan Government than in most other countric:..•ls.t ln 2009, 
ART clinics pcrfonncd 70,541 treatment cycles throughout Australia and 
New Zealand, which was a 14% increase from 2008 and a 48�o increase 
from 2005.185 Live deliveries resulted from 12,127, or 17.2%, of the 
70,541 cycles, for a total of 13,114 babies.l86 These deliveries accounted 
for approximately 3.2% of the live births in Australia in 2009.187 The 
extensive usc of ART cycles has come at a significant cost to the Australian 
government. The costs associated with a live birth through !VF range from 
$24,615.40 for a woman between thirty and thirty-three years old who is 
undergoing her first IVF treatment, to $168,625.00 for a woman between 
forty-two and forty-five years old undergoing her second treatment 
program.118 Australian Medicare expenditures on ARTs in 2005 totaled 
$97.5 million, representing a 117% increase from the S45 million spent in 
2003.189 Between January 2000 and December 2005, the tollll government 
expenditure for ARTs, which includes Medicare and the Phannaceutical 
Benefits Scheme, was $525.7 million. t90 ln response to these rising costs, 
the government placed a cap on the Medicare benefits available for ARTs, 
which purportedly saved $48.6 million in 2010.191 
Regulation of ARTs in Australia is allocated among the federal 
government and the individual states and territories. There is no federal 
legislation that regulates ARTs, but there is a certain amount of national 
uniformi� as a result of accreditation requirements and codes of 
practice.• 2 Under the the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 2002, 
a clinic that handles human embryos must be accredited, either through the 
Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee ("RTAC") of the 
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Ferulity Society of Australia ("FSA "), an organizauon of scientists and 
medical professionals involved in reproductive medicine, or through 
aoothcr accreditation program.19l In addition, the National llealth and 
Medical Research Council ("NHMRC") has propagated a sct of "Ethirol 
guidelines an thl! use of assisted reproductive ti'Chnalogy in clinical 
practice and research" that it urges all ART clinics throughout the country 
to follow. 194 The RTAC accreditation procedures requ ire clinics to 
"(p]rovidc evidence o f . . .  compliance with the NHMRC Ethical 
Guidelines on the usc of ART in clinical practice and rcsearch."195 It is 
important to note that "[a)Jthougb RTAC accreditation and compliance 
with RTAC and NHMRC guidelines arc not mandatory, there are strong 
incentives for compliance."196 For example, RTAC accreditation is a 
precondition for accessing the state-funded drug program, and compliance 
with NHMRC guidelines is a prerequisite for receiving public research 
funds}97 The practical effect, then, is that virtually all ART clinics must 
follow the RT AC accreditation and compliance procedures.19• 
Decisions about health can: Jaw in Australia "generally fallO within the 
constitubonal po"cr of the states and territories rather than the federal 
government," so health care law ·often varies considerably between 
jurisdictions."199 All of the states and territories have enacted legislation 
on the status of children born from donated gametes and embryos . ."200 
Only four states, however,-Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, 
and Western Australia-have passed legislation specifically regulating 
ARTs.201 If the legislation differs from the �uidelincs endorsed by the 
NHMRC, the state legislation takes precedence. 02 
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The fact that the Australian government partially reimburses assisted 
reproduction without re:.tricting the number of cycles or services that an 
individual can receive suggests that the government h:is in effect c�ted a 
positive right of access to ARTs through Medicare. Provision of the means 
necessary access ARTs has come at a significant financial cost to the 
government and has also prompted the Parliament of Victoria to coact 
broad legislation regulating the procedures. 
2. Parliament of Victoria Enacted Sweeping Regulatory Legislation 
Since passing the world's ftrst ART legislation, the Parliament of 
Victoria bas enacted one of the world's broadest frameworks for regulating 
ARTs.203 The current legislation, the Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 
2008 ("ART Act" or "the Act"), took effect on January I, 2010.204 The 
ART Act i.s divided mto 16 parts with 159 sections and regulates all aspects 
of ARTs, ranging from criminal offenses related to probibtted procedures, 
to establishing the Victorian Assisted Reproductive T�tmcnt Authority, 
which monitors compliance with the Acl The most relevant provisions for 
demonstrnting the extent to which Victoria regulates access to ARTs are 
the purposes and principles that guide the Act and the provisions governing 
access to treatment, presumptions against treatment, and appeals of 
treatment determination decisions. 
The primary purpose of the ART Act is "to regulate the use of assisted 
reproductive treatment and artificial insemination procedures."20, Other 
purposes include regulating access to information about ARTs, promoting 
research into infertility, and regulating surrogacy arrangemcnts.206 The 
Parliament of Victoria intended for the following principles to be given 
effect in fulfilling the purposes of the ART Act: 
(a) the welfo.n: and ontc:rcsts of persons born or tO be born IS a result of 
treatment proccdun:s .... paramount; 
(b) at no time should the use or treatment procedures be for the purpooe or 
explouong. on tllldt: or otherwise-{i) the rq>rodueti•e capabilttios of men and 
"'omen; or (ii) children born as a result of treatment procedures; 
(c) children born as the result of the use of donated g:unelcs have a right 10 
information obout their genetic parents; 
(d) the health and wellbeing of persons undergoing treatment procedures must 
be protected ot all times; 
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These guiding principles provide valuable insight into the intent behind 
the ART Act. On the one hand, the Act is broad in its application and 
prohibits discrimination based on an individual's "sexual orientation, 
marital status, race or religion." On the other hand, however, the interests 
of "persons to be born," not of persons using ARTs, arc considered 
"paramount." The principles thus seem to imply that the liberties of 
individuals who wish to use ARTs yield to tbc liberties of "persons to be 
born." 
The ART Act carefully regulates who can pcrfonn ART procedures. A 
clinic must provide documentation of RTAC accredillltion to become a 
"registered ART provider."208 Failure to comply with the ART provider 
requirement can result in criminal penalties, ranging from 480 penalty units 
(S60,792.90), to a four-year prison sentence, or both.209 The ART Act is 
even more specific with respect 10 who is able to undergo trentment 
procedures in Victoria. In order for a woman to qualify for treatment, a 
doctor must reasonably determine that she is: (i) "unlikely to become 
pregnant other than by a treatment procedure," or (ii) "unlikely to be able to 
carry a pregnancy or give birth to a child without a treatment procedure," or 
(iii) "at risk of transmitting a genetic abnormality or genetic disease to a 
child born as a result of a pregnancy conceived other than by a treatment 
procedure:•2IO To undergo treatment, a woman and her partner, either her 
spouse or "a person who lives with [her] as a couple on a genuine domestic 
basis," must consent to the particular procedure, undergo counseling, and 
submit to a child protection order check and criminal record chcck.211 
Importantly, an ART provider is prohibited from performing a 
treatment �roccdure on 8 woman if there is a "presumption against 
treatment." 12 A presumption applies against a woman who wishes to 
undergo ART treatment if a criminal record check reveals that the woman 
or her partner has been convicted of a sexual or violent offense or if 8 child 
protection order check reveals that a child was removed from the custody 
of the woman or her partoer.213 In addition, the ART Act specifically 
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outlaws treatment procedures intended to produce a child of a particular 
sex, unless sex selection is necessary "to avoid the risk of transmission of a 
genetic aboon113lity or a genetic disease" or the Patient Review Panel, a 
body tasked with reviewing refusals to provide treatment, appro•-es the 
procedure. 2t4 An ART provider who violates the ban on non-mcdtcal sex 
selection is subject to a penalty of 240 units (S35,476) undlor a two years 
imprisonment.21S 
If there is a presumption against treatment, or if an ART provider 
otherwise refuses to provide treatment, an individual may ftle an 
application for review with the live-member Patient Review Panel ("PRP"). 
This includes circumstances in which an ART provider "reasonably 
believes that a child that may be born as a result of a treatment procedure 
carried out on the woman would be at risk of abuse or negleet.•ll6 Tbe 
PRP decides if there is a barrier to treatment, basing its decision on the 
ART Act's guiding principles and determining "whether carrying out a 
treatment procedure . . . is consistent with the best interests of a child who 
would be born. "217 The regulations governing when ART providers and 
the PRP can deny treatment further demonstrate the primacy that the ART 
Act gives to tbe interests of"pcrsons to be born." 
A person "whose interests are effected" by a PRP decision concluding 
that there is a barrier to treatment may appeal the decision to the Victorian 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal ("VCA T").21l The Parliament of 
Victoria created VCAT through the Victorian Civil and Administrative 
Tribunal Act 1998 to provide individuals with "an innovative, flexible and 
accountable �anisation which is accessible and delivers a fair and 
efficient dispute resolution service. •219 Among the issues that VCA T 
handles are disputes about discrimination, health and privacy, dtsability 
services, and guardiansbip.220 A VCAT case is presided over by one to 
five VCAT members, at least one of whom must be a lawyer.22t VCAT 
exercise:. both original and review jurisdiction, dependmg on the authority 
granted to it under enabling enactments. 222 The review jurisdiction is best 
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characterized as d� no•'O because on review, VCAT "hns all the functions 
of the decision-maker.•22J VCAT decisions are generally appealed to the 
Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria, but only those appeals 
based on questions of law. 224 
By providing coverage for ARTs under Medicare, Australia's stale­
funded health care system, the Australian government has effectively 
provided individuals with a positive right to the means necessary to access 
assisted reproduction with no limit on the number of cycles one may 
undergo. Regulation of the procedures is left to the individual states, so 
there is considerable variation in the regulatory [ramcworks. The broad 
scope of the ART Act implemented by the Parliament of Victoria makes it 
a powerful piece of legislation for controlling access to ARTs. Despite !be 
expansive nature of these regulations, the ART Act allows for a positive 
right to access ARTs, in contraSt to the neg;.tive right that C:(ists in the 
United States, as demonstrated by two recent cases from the Supreme 
Court of Victoria and VCA T. This highly regulated sy�tcm does, however, 
come at a cost to procreative liberty, as it can �uh m placing arbitrary 
limits on reproduchve choice when tribunals face controversial ethical 
issues.ns 
3. Victorian IVF Cases Reflect a Positive Right to Use ARTs Subject to 
Limitations 
The extent to which Victoria's highly-regulated system provides 
individuals with a positive right to procreate through the usc of ARTs is 
most clearly demonstrated by a discussion of two recent access-to-ART 
cases, Castles v Secretary of the De�rtment of Justice226 and ABY v 
Patient Review Panel (" ABY & ABZ"), 7 which came before the Supreme 
Court of Victoria and VCAT, respectively. Cnstles involved a low security 
prisoner's request to access NF while serving her sentence, and AB Y & 
ABZ addressed a claim that a husband's guilty plea to criminal sexual acts 
with a minor was 001 a barrier against treatment In both eases, the 
Supreme Court of Victoria and VCAT detennined that the women should 
be able to undergo the requested procedures. An analysis of Cnstles and 
ABY & ABZ indicates that, unlike the United States, Victoria has taken an 
approach to procreative liberty that recognizes a positive right to access 
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treatment, provided that individuals satisfy the brood requirements of the 
ART Act. 
ln Castles, the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that 
Kimberley Castles, a forty-five-year-old low security prisoner at HM 
Prison Tarrcngower had a right under s 47( I )(f) of the Corrections Act 
1986 to undergo IVF trcatment.228 Although Castles did not directly 
involve an application of the ART Act, the court's discussion of infertility 
provides further proof that as long as an individual meets the standards set 
by the ART Act, there is a positive right to access ARTs in Victoria. On 
November 20, 2009, Ms. Castles was convicted of social security fraud for 
claiming almost S 140,000 in payment benefits that she was not entitled to 
receive, and subsequently sentenced to three years imprisonment.229 Ms. 
Castles was incarcerated at a maximum security prison before being 
transferred to the Tam:ngower prison, a minimum security facility that 
"emphasises release preparation and c.ommunity integration," at which 
point her t\\oo-ycar-old daughter was allowed to live wnh her in one of the 
"self-<:ontained umts (oc 'cottages'). •230 Ms. Castles had left Tarrengower 
with an accompanying officer on thirty-six occasions, includmg for visits to 
a medical doctor, optometrist, and dentist.231 
Ms. Castles had been receiving NF treatment at the Melbourne NF 
Clinic for over one year prior to her incarceration. From the beginning of 
her incarceration in November 2009, sbe filed requests to allow her to 
continue the treatment at her own expense while she was in prison because 
when she turned forty-six in December 20 I 0, she would no longer be 
eligible for treatment at the Melbourne IVF Clinic.232 The Secretary oftbe 
Department of Justice denied Ms. Castles's request on May 3, 2010. On 
April 23, 20 I 0, Ms. Castles initiated proceedings seeking an injunction 
against enforcement of the Secretary's decision.2l3 The Practice Court of 
the Supreme Court of Victoria denied Ms. Castles's request on the grounds 
that she was "not presently legally entitled to NF treatment" because she 
had not undergone the criminal record and child protcet1on order checks 
required by sections 10 and 14 of the ART Act.2J4 
After a brief trial in early June 2010, the Trial Division of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria handed down a judgment granting Ms. Castles's request 
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to ac<:ess the IVF treatment. 1be court found that Ms. Castles had a right to 
the treatment under s 47(1)(1) of the Com:ctioos Act, which grants 
prisoners "the right to ha�e ac<:ess to reasonable medical can: and treatment 
necessary for the preservation of health. "235 Significantly, the court's only 
discussion of the ART Act was to note that the "checks [required by the 
ART Act] have now been satisfactorily completed. "236 
The court reasoned that IVF is a "treatment for a legitimate medical 
condition[ and there is) no proper basis to treat IVF treatment differently 
from other fonns of medical intervention that arc considered to he 
necessary to enable people to live dignified and productive lives."237 The 
court was persuaded that the "respect for the inherent dignity of the human 
person," protected by section 22( I) of the Austrnlian Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006, applied to its decision about Ms. 
Castles's reproductive health_2lS Ultimately, the court found that "IYF 
treatment is both necessary for the preservation of Ms[.) Castles1s] 
reproductive health ornl reoso110ble, consistentU with her right os o penon 
deprived of liberty to be treated with humanity.•239 Although the Supreme 
Court of Victoria did not decide Castles based on an interpretation of the 
ART Act, the deference given to the determination of eligibility reached 
under the ART Act, the connection between reproductive health and the 
"preservation of health" guaranteed by the Corrections Act, and the prison's 
duty to accommodate medical needs by facilitating transportation and 
escorts, albeit at Ms. Castles's expense, provide strong support for the claim 
that the right to usc ARTs is a positive right in Victoria. 
In addition to the Supreme Court of Victoria protecting the right to use 
assisted reproduction, VCA T's interpretation of the ART Act in a similarly 
controversial case reveals the broad right to access ARTs that exists in 
Victoria. In ABY & ABZ, VCAT had to determine whether there was a 
barrier to allowing ABZ to undergo NF treatment because her husband 
ABY had a conviction for sexual offenses that qualified as a presumption 
against treatment under the ART Act.240 VCA T determined that there was 
no harrieT to treatment and that ABZ could receive IVF treatment because 
ABY's "sexual offending" did not pose risks to a ch1ld who would be 
bom.w 
In February 2008, ABY was charged witb committing "criminal acts of 
a sexual nature" against a sixteen-year old girl who attended a school for 
students with lca.ming and behavioral difficulties where ABY was a martial 
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ar1S teacher.242 Six months after ABY's arrest, in August 2008, ABY and 
ABZ completed an application to undergo IVF at the Monash IVf 
Clinic.24J ABZ was pennitted to undergo treatment, but the cycle was 
unsuccessful. The couple delayed a second cycle because of ABY's 
impending trial.244 In January 2009, ABY pled guilty to three counts of 
sexual pcnelnltion of a minor and was sentenced to three years 
imprisonment. He served one year before being released in January 
2010.245 
In between the couple's first application for IVF and their second 
application, filed in July 2010, the ART Act went into effect and 
implemented section 14, which states that a presumption against treatment 
exists if a woman or her partner bas been convicted of a sexual offensc.246 
As a result of ABY's offense, there was a presumption against ABZ 
receiving IVF treatment. Tbe couple filed an appeal with the PRP, which 
ruled that ABZ could not undergo treatment. The PRP reasoned that ABY 
took advantage of *a vulnerable young person with whom he was in a 
relationship of trust. �w The PRP was "'not satisfied in light of these 
serious and recent events that the welfare of child born to ABY wiU be 
protected. �248 
VCAT set side the PRP decision and determined that there was no 
barrier to ABZ undergoing IVf treatment, provided that ABZ completed 
twelve sex offender counseling sessions.249 The tribunal determined that, 
of the guiding principles set out in section 5 of the ART Act, the only one 
that was directly relevant to the present case was that "the welfare and 
interests of persons born or to be born as a result of treatment procedures 
are paramount.•250 Noting that under Australian case law, "paramount 
means overriding," VCAT thus focused its decision exclusively on the 
interest of "persons to be born. "251 In language reminiscent of Robertson's 
"better to be born" argument, the tribunal reasoned that denying IVf 
treatment to ABZ "would deny any chil d to be born through such treatment 
their very existence. •252 The ABY & A BZ tribunal's reasoning differed 
from Rober1son's approach in that VCA T did not find it necessary "to 
decide if the interests of the proposed parents are relevant to the 
detennination of whether there is a barrier to treatment."m 
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In reachmg its decision, VCA T relied on a report from two "pre­
eminent expens m the assessment and treatment of sex offenders" to find 
that ABY was not a pedophile and bad a low risk of reoffending. 254 The 
tribunal also found it "extremely unlikely that ABY would have difficulty 
discerning the boundaries between parent and child" or that he poses a risk 
of sexual oliensc against a biological child. 2SS VCAT concluded that ABZ 
could receive IVF treatment because ABY's olicnding did not create a risk 
of hann to a child to be bom or indicate a tendency to put his interests 
before a child's.256 In fact, the only limitation imposed on ABZ's access to 
the IVF was that ABY complete the required counseling sessions before 
ABZ could undergo the treatment.257 Although the ABY & ABZ decision 
was not based on the couple's interest in procreating, VCA T's interpretation 
of the ART Act to permit the wife of a convicted sex offender to undergo 
IVF suggests that the Act allows broad access to ARTs in Victoria. 
The focus on the interests of "persons to be born" in ABY & ABZ did 
not prevent the couple from accessing IVF. but o.notheT case before VCAT 
demonstrates that the highly-regulated system in Victoria can ba'e the 
opposite effect of limiting procreative liberty. That case, JS v Parienr 
Review Panel (" JS & LS"), 158 addressed the prohibition against sex 
selection of embryos for non-medical purposes. VCA T dismissed an 
application for review of the PRP decision denying permission to use IVF 
for non-medical sex selection on the grounds that "it is ethically 
undesirable. 011d comrary to the welfare of the child, to make acceptance of 
a child conditional on its sex. •2S9 
JS gave birth to a daughter in 2006 who died tragically as a result of 
"brain injuries and complications" shortly after birth.21i0 At the time of the 
case, JS and her husband LS had three sons, all of whom were conceived 
naturally. but no daughter.26t The couple wanted to use fVF for sex 
selection so that JS could give birth to a daughter, "to improve their 
emotional wellbeing, to help them move on from their tragedy and to 
complete their family. •262 JS and LS were diagnosed with post-traumatic 
stress disorder after their daughter's death, and they felt that using sex 
selection of embryos would help them overcome the trauma of having lost 
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their infant daughter.263 JS admitted that she was -despemte to ba,·c 
another [daughter) for (her) psychological wellbeing.'"264 JS and LS also 
believed that having a daughter would improve the psychologtcal wellbeing 
of their family, because their sons would "see[) their parents in a better 
fmme of mind."263 
In April 2010, JS and LS consulted a fertility doctor at the Monash IVF 
Clinic about their desire to usc POD for sex selection in the hopes of JS 
giving birth to a daughter.266 The doctor supported the couple's decision, 
but because section 28 of the ART Act prohibits sex selection of embryos 
unless necessary to prevent the "tmnsmission of a genetic abnonnality" or 
otherwise approved by the PRP, JS and LS bad to file an application for 
approval with the PRP. The PRP denied the application for two reasons. 267 
First, the PRP commented that if the couple's reason for using sex selection 
was "family balancing to assist emotional wellbeing. then [that) is not a 
sufficiently gmve reason to approve a procedure which would otherwise be 
a criminal offence. •261 Second, the PRP reiter.ued that the tnterests of 
"petSOns born or to be born" are paramount and noted that nothing in the 
couple's request related "to the welfare and interests of the proposed 
child."269 
JS and LS subs�ntly filed an application for review of the PRP 
decision with VCAT. During this time, JS went to the Monash NF 
Clinic for an ART procedure and became pregnant with twins.211 After 
learning that the twins were both male, JS terminated the pregnancy.m JS 
and LS indicated that JS "would continue to tenninatc" pregnancies 
achieved through IVF if the fetuses were males. They said that their desire 
for a daughter was so strong that they were prepared to travel to Thailand 
or the United States, where POD for sex selection is legal. 273 
Over the course of a two-day bearing in March 20 I I ,  VCAT beard 
testimony from JS and LS, their fertility doctor, JS's psychiatrist, and their 
psychologist, all of whom supported the sex selection procedure.274 VCAT 
refused the couple's request, relying instead on the testimony of two 
ethicists and a post-tmumatic stress disorder e:tpert.275 VCAT pointed out 
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that "[t]hcre was no express reference to the welfare and interests of the 
child to be born" in any of the evidence presented m favor of the couple's 
requesL 276 Furthennore, the tribunal reasoned that even if giving birth to a 
daughter could improve JS's mental health, an assertion for which it found 
insufficient support, when "there is a conflict between the welfare and 
interest� of a child to be born, and the health and wellbeing of the person 
undergoing an ART procedure, . . .  the conflict must be resolved in favour 
of the child's welfare and interests."m Ultimately, the tribunal dismissed 
the couple's application because it was "not satisfied" that it was in the best 
interests of n child to be born through non-medical sex selcction.278 
VCAT explicitly rejected the claim that concern for the welfare and 
interests of JS and LS, the individuals seeking to use ARTs, was an 
adequate reason to allow non-medical sex selection. 279 JS & LS thus 
represents a clear limitation on procreative liberty based on an 
interpretatiOn of the ART AcL The juxtaposition of A 8 Y & ABZ with JS & 
LS makes it di flicuh to understand VCA T's reasons for pcnnitting the 
requested IVF treatment in the former case while prohibiting it in the 
former. Certainly, both cases invoh·ed controversial ethical issues, those of 
a convicted sex offender and his wife using IVF and of a couple seeking 
non-medical sex selection. That VCAT did not find a barrier to treating 
ABZ because her husband's sexual offense was not related to pedophilia, 
yet refused to allow JS and LS to select the sex of an embryo, suggests that 
VCAT could place further limits on procreative liberty with no justification 
other than that an action is "ethically undesirable." 
By partially reimbursing the costs associated with ARTs through 
Medicare, the Australian government effectively created n positive right to 
access ARTs, which led the Par liament of Victoria to enact broad 
legislation regulating assisted reproduction. On the one hand, the 
jurisprudence of Victorian courts and tribunals in two controversial IVF 
cases, involving requests to access treatment while in prison and when 
one's partner has a conviction for a sexual offense, 1mplies that there is a 
positive nght to access ARTs as long as one satisfies the standards of the 
ART Acl On the other hand, the extensive regulation has the potential tO 
place arbitrary limits on procreative liberty based on the "ethically 
undesirable" nature of a procedure, as demonstrated by the decision not to 
allow JS and LS to use IVF for sex selection. 
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The different regulatory frameworks for ARTs in the United States and 
Victoria, Australia reveal the cyclical nature of "procreative tourism"280-
from the 1980s when Americans travelled to Victoria to access JVF, to 
2013 when Australians are presumably traveling to the United States to 
access treatment with fewer regulations and restrictions.281 The divergent 
regulatory approaches for ARTs pursued in the United States and Victoria 
infonns an understanding of this interesting phenomenon. While the U.S. 
system mirrors Robertson's conception of procreative liberty as a negative 
right against government interference,282 Victoria has adopted a highly 
regulated system that provides individuals with the means necessary to 
access ARTs.283 A discussion of recent JVF case law in Victoria, however, 
suggests that the extensive regulations that accompany a positive right to 
assisted reproduction can have the opposite effect of limiting procreative 
liberty.2B4 The better system for regulating ARTs is the one implemented 
in the United States, which reflects Robertson's notion of a robust negative 
right to procreate. This scheme is preferable to one that provides the means 
necessary to access ARTs because protecting the freedom to procreate 
prevents the negative consequences that result from excessive 
governmental regulation, while permitting certain limitations to prevent 
substantial harm. 
An important critique of Robertson's approach to procreative Uberty is 
that it "appears to possess no logical stopping point, expandinf to the outer 
limits of technological possibility and human ingenuity."28 Robertson 
does, however, acknowledge that certain banns justify placing constraints 
on procreative liberty .286 He contemplates these banns in conjunction with 
the view that individual autonomy and �rivacy in reproductive decision· 
making deserve presumptive primacy.28 Unlike the approach taken in 
Australia, in which the focus on the interests of "persons to be born• can 
limit procreative liberty,2BB Roberson's conception gives primary 
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consideration IO the interests of the individuals making reproductive 
choices. 
As a re:.uh, Robertson focuses less on societal barm.217 than on so­
called "tangible" hrums to individuals who seck to exercise the freedom to 
procreate. In the context of ARTs, Robertson acknowledges that the need 
"to protect consumers from fraud, misrepresentation, and incompetent 
practitioners" not only Justifies, but may also require, regulation as technology proliferates. For example, he would likely support state 
regulations that give effcc.t to the ASRM guidelines on embryo 
implantation as a way to address the medical and ethical concerns that 
result from higher-{)rder multiple pregnancies and births.291 Permissible 
regulations would also likely extend to fVF refund programs, under which 
"patients pay a premium up front, but they are guaranteed multiple cycles 
of IVF and a refund if they fail to conceive" as a means of preventing 
exploitation. 292 
Contrary to critiqucs,29J Robertson's approach can accommodate the 
rapidly changing technological landscape of ARTs. According to 
Robertson, "[s]pcculations about potential future uses of [ARTs like] PGD 
should not prevent otherwise acceptable current uses of PG0."294 For 
example, in Children of Choice, Robertson noted that sex selection of 
embryos may be pennissible at the pre-implantation stage because the 
expense and burden of the procedure would likely prevent it from 
becoming widcspread.295 Just over twenty years later, however, in light of 
increasing technological capabilities, Robertson refined his view on PGD 
for sex sclction.296 He noted that the concern for "sexist social mores" 
and gender discrimination may justify limitations on using sex selection for 
a fli'SI child, but argued that there is a stronger case for allowing the 
technique for purposes of family balancing and gender variety. 297 
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Many scholars have written on issues of reproductive JUStice in 
Australia,m yet no scholarsllip to date has addn:sscd the negative 
implications on procreative liberty of a highly regulated system that 
provides the means necessary to access to ARTs. 299 This Article has 
sought to provide insight on that aspect of assisted reproduction by 
evaluating the regulatory structures in the United States and Victoria and 
concluding that the optimal approach to regulating ARTs derives from 
Robertson's notion of procreative liberty-a negative right to procreate 
subject to limitations only when substantial harms are likely to result. This 
juxtaposition of the experiences of the United States and Victoria 
demonstrates that the United States "got it right" in creating a system that 
protects a robust negative right to procreate because, although "[t]he 
freedom to act docs not mean that we will act wisely • . . .  denying that 
freedom may be even more unwise, for it denies individuals' respect in the 
most fundamental choices of their lives. •300 
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